No. 15

<Horizon-meaning and original induction. The world horizon as structured empty horizon>[[1]](#footnote-1)

The following shall enhance precision in the explication of horizons that are founded one upon another, implying each other:

“Horizon” means, as we can also say, **induction** belonging essentially to each experience, and being inseparable from it – original induction as essential composition, I emphasize that, in each experience itself. The word is useful, since it indicates in advance (an “induction” itself) to induction in the common sense of a mode of inference, and to this [induction] leading eventually back in its actually understanding clarification to the original most primitive anticipation. From this thus an actual “theory of induction” (which one has striven for so much , and so unavailingly)has to be built up. But this shall only be noted in passing; for us it comes down to the horizon structures and to what essentially belongs to the horizon.

This original “induction” or anticipation shows itself <as> a variant mode of originally instituting activity, of activity and original *intentio*, that is <as> a mode of “intentionality”, simply that [intentionality] that has a meaning beyond the core <of> the datum, the anticipating [intentionality]. To this corresponds essentially the form of fulfilling: for the perception the perceptual [form], and in complete originality the <lived> duration of perception as perception of the same in continually different modes of proper and improper perception, or of [what is] properly perceived of the same and of what is induced, as continual synthesis of fusion of perceptions with perception in the form of a continuous succession. We thereby have a double originality of fulfilling: Firstly, since the fulfilling is perception wherein the induced presents itself as “itself”; secondly, since the fulfilling as fulfilling immediately takes place in an original way, **[138]** and not in the form of a recognition with implied mediations in which induced inductions do mediate. Certainly, the immediate fulfilling as continuity of a process of fulfilling again implies itself differences of immediacy and mediacy in the phases of continuity. The perception has its horizon of **co-present**, of the induced one that would be fulfilled as then original, perceptual [co-present] through continuous perception (on different “ways”) in originally continuous immediacy.

This implies special further explications; because a lot has to be exhibited here. In our line the following is implied: In the course of perceiving as a continually “getting to know more closely” of the same perceived, as something showing itself with ever new perceptual content (sides of the object), each perceptual phase (ontic: each respective side) gains **its** horizon, an ever new one. An important theme is the way that the synthesis of the sides does not <take place> as a succession, as an integration, but goes through the identical sense as a continuous accepting of the continuing acceptance under closer determination that had already been accepted in the mode “perception”, but <as> a continuing acceptance under modification of sense. This synthesis of the sides or the respective complete side which comes about due to lasting acceptance, continuing acceptance under changing of the sense, [and which is] accepted purely and simply as knowledge of the thing having become known (while only a special content is “properly perceived”) is obviously based upon a synthesis of the horizons, upon their continuous synthetic functioning within the constitution of being sense. The How has to be explored.

Furthermore, a constant inner difference within the respective horizon is fundamental. **A new horizon emerges in each phase**. This may say: In each phase an induction takes place in which a new co-present predelineates itself in a (more or less complete) determination, initially within the distant thing, and mediately for the actual thing itself. It is this what one initially thinks of under the title “induction”. But that which is immediately induced as immediately to be fulfilled in a perceptual way, and that which is induced through this immediate in a **[139]** continuous mediacy have to be distinguished here.[[2]](#footnote-2) (Obviously this does not imply a being induced on one level so to say or within one juxtaposition, but in one continuity, where the inductivity is such [an inductivity] within the intermingling, a continuous implication of intentionality.) On the other hand we have to call attention to the fact that this whole immediate and continually mediate induction or anticipation of what has to be fulfillingly actualized by way of possible continuation of perception as predelineation of the determined co-existent, namely of the co-determining the same object, of what is to become known with it and through it, is not everything. The determinacy is determinacy in a field of indeterminacy; the “**predelineated**”, (in the narrower sense) the induced, is an element within a horizon which is also “**completely undetermined” empty horizon**.[[3]](#footnote-3) But the properly induced is not like an island within the sea, but the sea itself changes into land wherever it is pursued. That which is empty is just a mode of the incomplete determinacy that **itself** becomes a relatively more perfect determinacy within the change. The **determined** has to be explicated in its way, [it has] to be clarified; that which is **empty** is not explicable, but within the change of the undifferentiated attendant meaning into differentiating predelineation it becomes explicable within this [predelineation]. In general this is a relativity. Because what actually is predelineated there, the determined, is only relatively determined, it has its own special horizon of indeterminacy that will change[[4]](#footnote-4) within the “coming closer”, [within] the continuously closer perceiving, into perfect, into richer (but possibly also corrected) determinacy, as long as **[140]** the perception goes on continuously as perception of the same, that is, [as long as] this self is not “corrected” in its being, is not cancelled, is not converted into a “This is not, instead there is something else”, and the like.

It is important that perception within the primitive mode of certainty of being – and as normal mode taken as basis for all variations of modalization – has as induction horizon always only being correlates of the certainty. Each perception <is> a continuous course of induction and verification, a continuity of self-verification. Also the external horizon is to be grasped thus. The universal horizon is world horizon – or horizon of the respective core of perception, of the thematic or not thematic [core of perception], in constant continuing perception causing the world to be perceptibly experienced.

All this is not only accepted <for> the inner horizon belonging to something real as horizon of perception of its explicable being, but <also> for the external horizon, and the total horizon as such.

In how far can be stated in earnest that the total horizon predelineated inner differences on the one hand, that it was an undifferentiated horizon on the other hand, or that it was a horizon in continuing, constant marking of differences, and thus [that] an explicable and a not explicable horizon were to be distinguished? It might be objected: The physical thing in any case has its ontological form being particularized through the already different, through what has become cognized, and apart from that “empty” horizon, yet not empty actually, but of the general ontological structure that I can explicate as what is still undetermined of **this** thing – undetermined in acceptance as to be filled out with the “special peculiarities” of this thing in fulfilling perception. – What does all this designate? What <does> the different talking of determination, of determining oneself by way of perceiving cognizance as specialty, determined peculiarity of the thing that is always accepted being ontologically formed, within a constant horizonedness, anticipation that receives the particularizing marking by way of continuing “induction”, with what analogously only something predelineated is met, <designate>? Nay, even more. Each thing is “typically apperceived” according to its sort and genre as what it respectively is perceptually in acceptance of factual existence; and this for its part **[141]** lies within the ont<ic> horizon as marking according to the sort that just now gains its “determined” particularization towards something “individually” peculiar to it. Ont<ological> universality, according to genre and sort. – Each has its way of “explication”.

Perception as perception of the thing, of this thing, is perception through apperception, through co-acceptance of the horizon as determining the being sense. This co-acceptance is “universal in an undetermined way”. To show oneself is to show oneself in a determined way. Anticipated is in an “undetermined” way, in a vague, ambiguous, “general” way: something showing itself in possible continuation of the perception within a synthetic showing-oneself and [within] something showing itself. The unity of an acceptance of being, of a being, the totality as the apriori is continually in progress, in every moment the thing as the [thing] in the respective mode of givenness, the respective horizon, but in such a way that <the> thing carries at the same time in this respective horizonedness the totality of the possible perception and of all respectiveness in anticipation. The physical thing datum can be kept still – as continuity of the still standing perception (in each phase the same givenness of sides); and thus the sense of perception, the perceived can be explicated, be made distinct in its constantly identical mode of givenness: the being sense in this mode: Thus for each phase of mobile perception, insofar as each can possibly be brought to a stillstand, but in continuation clarification as fulfillment. What happens constantly is, properly speaking, a double fulfillment, if “fulfillment” is the general contrary title to “anticipation”, and also a mediate anticipation of horizon is called “fulfilled” through anticipated horizonedness. Horizon as horizon becomes “itself-given”. We thus have within continuation anticipation on the one hand, in which a new horizon is anticipated from the first functioning horizon, and this [anticipation] fulfills itself in the course of perception. But we then have the fulfillment as self-presentation of the thing’s core itself as well, of the side. Within the getting-to-know-the-thing the initially anticipated horizon becomes known as well, and as known [it becomes] explicable in its horizonedness. [It becomes] more distinct, explicated in its respectiveness, but also in its mediacies which it implies anticipating future horizons. These are anticipated as [future horizons] of the further predelineated perceptions that will carry along new predelineations. **[142]** – The intentional whole a synthesis which constitutes from the vivid perceiving an apriori of the sense, a sense unity that is a vivid acceptance of unity as co-acceptance, an explicable unity, thus <explicable> in its sense components.

Something else: to “intuit” the being of a physical thing in advance, to enter its respective open range of possibilities, intuitionally – that is, making intuitional the being sense that has been made distinct.

Appendix IX

Appresentation and presentation with regard to single physical things and with regard to the whole world. <World constituted in empty intentions>[[5]](#footnote-5)

If we call “representations” all mental processes that do not make conscious “in person”, then the empty horizons of the thing perceptions are called “representations” with regard to the invisible sides of the thing. On the other hand: Insofar as they are essential for thing perceptions, and [insofar as] a physical thing can only with their help become present as being “in person”, they present and do <not> only represent. Within the frame of the whole perception the physical thing itself becomes conscious, that is, it becomes implicitly conscious in vivid present with regard to its back. Directed towards the thing, <we> have it originally conscious itself. On the other hand, as soon as we relate to the invisible sides, we have to reverse our talking, and speak of representations. Accordingly, in common talk we say “I see the thing”, and again “I do not see the back”. I, the attentively perceiving ego, thus can have different attitudes: towards the thing as unity, or also towards invisible properties of a physical thing. Accordingly I distinguish “**presentations**” and “**appresentations**”. The perception is presentation with “regard” to the thing, and it implies as many components of proper presentation, as many components as I can have properly (given “in person”) perceived in respective regards. The regard towards empty components opens up appresentation. Each appresentation makes co-present. Each transcendent perception can only present its transcendent object by way of appresentation. The transcendent perceptions could be called “appresentative perceptions”. (The same designation **[143]** of the word “appresentation” can be meant by the word “apperception”. But the word can also have another sense.)

Let us consider the thing within the physical context. Instead of being focused on a single thing, we can also focus on optional other co-given things. But this also in the sense that we are focused on the physical surroundings that are undetermined and in any case co-given in empty horizons, [surroundings] which form a unity as well, a unity that stretches beyond the physicalness given “in person” into [the undetermined], and encompassing the undetermined. There we have again the difference between presentation and appresentation in the form: the “properly” perceived things of the surroundings, and the co-perceived [things of the surroundings] – namely if we, focused on the surroundings, talk of the perception of this surroundings.[[6]](#footnote-6) As soon as we focus on things, we speak of [things] existing but unseen within the surroundings. Thus the surroundings are always given in their infinity, in their undetermined determinability as surroundings of our body, and originally given. Thus for the present, similarly as well by way of the corresponding expectations for <the> future, and by way of the empty retentions for <the> past. Thus through the empty intentions in all these forms not only the limited unitary thing or a piece of “properly” perceived surroundings constitutes itself, but the whole world extended into an undetermined spatial present, and into an undetermined future, and into the past.

1. End of May or beginning of June 1934 – Editor’s note. [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. Of course this is about the constitution of the „perceptual thing“ within the near-distant-physicality (understood as intentional sense unit). In each mode of the distance of the first perceptual thing (as surface thing) we have a respectively proper itself-given as side; but this is not a side of the thing itself, but a self, wherein the “finite” self presents itself in grades of completeness. The completely being near is the side of the thing itself in completely most immediate self-presentation, but on the other hand as telos of perfection it is the perfect of the continuation of imperfection in its intentional sequence of levels. [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. Predelineation is anticipating marking of inner „differences“, of outstanding particularities which beforehand had not been marked as intentional, of special peculiarities („properties“) as [peculiarities] that are to be brought to giving of something-itself, explicable [peculiarities]. [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
4. But we initially have to desist from modalization. [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
5. Possibly February 1932. – Editor’s note. [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
6. The perception of the endless surroundings through presentation and appresentation. [↑](#footnote-ref-6)